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Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc.: A Lesson
in Reading Between the Lines
In Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc. 1 the North Carolina
Supreme Court alters the law of the state in three significant aspects. The court
abandons the doctrine of culpable ignorance as sufficient proof of scienter in a
fraud action; it lowers the standard of care for corporate directors and officers to
avoid individual liability to third parties for some torts committed on behalf of
the corporation; and it finds the statutory treble damages remedy for deceptive
trade practices unavailable in misdealings between two businesses that fall short
of intentional fraud. Silent on the policy justifications behind these shifts, the
court fails even to acknowledge its departure from prior law.
This Note explores the changes the court's language in Myers & Chapman
necessarily implies. The Note attempts to discern the legal or policy bases, if
any, behind the shifts. It then concludes that the developments hidden between
the lines of the Myers & Chapman decision combine to cloak businesses defend-
ing commercial disputes in an extra layer of protection.
On April 25, 1984, defendant Thomas G. Evans signed and swore to an
application for payment, certifying that heating and air conditioning equipment
needed for construction of a High Point shopping center had been ordered and
stored in a bonded warehouse.2 The equipment was to be used by Thomas G.
Evans, Inc. (Evans, Inc.), the defendant corporation for which Evans and his
wife were sole directors and officers, in performing its subcontract with plaintiff
general contractor Myers & Chapman, Inc.3 According to the terms of the sub-
contract, Evans, Inc. could receive periodic payment for work completed, minus
a ten percent retainage, by submitting the sworn applications. 4 In May 1984
plaintiff paid the corporate defendant for all the materials listed in the applica-
tion. 5 A second application submitted in June recertified that all the materials
had been purchased and stored. 6
In August 1984 Thomas Evans decided to wind up his business.7 With
1. 323 N.C,. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
2. Id. at 560-62, 374 S.E.2d at 387-88.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 561, 374 S.E.2d at 387; Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief, exhibit 2(g), Myers & Chap-
man (No. 140PA88). The application contained the following statement:
The undersigned Contractor certifies that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief the Work covered by this Application for Payment has been completed in accordance
with the Contract Documents, and that all amounts have been paid by him for Work for
which previous Certificates for Payment were issued and payments received from the
Owner, and that current payments shown herein are now due.
Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 561, 374 S.E.2d at 387. The language of the application in this case
is taken from the standard form prescribed by the American Institute of Architects, which is widely
used throughout the construction industry. Amicus Curiae Brief at 2, Myers & Chapman (No.
140PA88).
5. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 561-62, 374 S.E.2d at 388.
6. Id. at 562, 374 S.E.2d at 388.
7. Id.
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plaintiff's consent,'Evans, Inc. subcontracted with Custom Comfort, Inc. to
complete the High Point job for the monetary balance remaining on the con-
tract.8 After Custom Comfort began work, it was unable to locate specialty
items covered by the April application, purportedly stored in the warehouse and
already paid for by plaintiff. 9 Plaintiff ordered the specialty items, paid for them
a second time, and sued Evans, Inc. and Thomas Evans, individually, to recover
its loss.10
The case against the individual defendant was tried on theories of fraud and
gross negligence in permitting fraud.11 At trial, Thomas Evans admitted that he
had no personal knowledge whether the materials were stored in the warehouse
when he swore to this fact, to the "best of his knowledge, information and be-
lief," in the payment application. 12 Evans based the application on a handwrit-
ten document prepared by Evans, Inc.'s project manager, which Evans had
accepted as true without asking a single question.13 The jury found Evans indi-
vidually liable for fraud and gross negligence and awarded $11,731 in compensa-
tory damages. 14 The trial judge concluded that Evans' actions amounted to an
unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 75-1.115 and trebled the damages. 16
8. Id.
9. Id. The April application for payment of $33,227 covered some large air handling units as
well as $11,731 worth of small electronic equipment specially designed to run the system. Plaintiff-
Appellant's New Brief at 4. The large units were stored in the warehouse, but the specialty items
never were stored or purchased by Evans, Inc. Id. Plaintiff received a storage invoice from the
warehouse, which provided apparent documentation for the April application. See id.
10. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 562, 374 S.E.2d at 388. Plaintiffmay have named Evans as
an individual defendant out of necessity. The record and briefs filed in the case do not indicate
whether Evans had completed the dissolution of his corporation. Plaintiff may have been able suc-
cessfully to execute a judgment only against the individual defendant. See infra note 122.
Thomas Evans' wife, Brenda, also was named as an individual defendant and was found liable
by the jury. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 563-64, 374 S.E.2d at 388-89. The supreme court
vacated the judgment as it applied to Brenda Evans, holding that since she signed the application
only in her capacity as a notary, she could not be liable for any misrepresentations it contained. Id.
at 573, 374 S.E.2d at 394.
11. Id. at 562, 374 S.E.2d at 388.
12. Id. at 566-67, 374 S.E.2d at 390-91.
13. Id. at 571, 374 S.E.2d at 393.
14. Id. at 562-63, 374 S.E.2d at 388-89. The jury found the corporate defendant liable for unjust
enrichment. Id. at 562, 374 S.E.2d at 388. The trial judge entered judgment against the corporate
and individual defendants jointly and severally. Id. at 564, 374 S.E.2d at 389. The court of appeals
found no error as to the corporate defendant, Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 89
N.C. App. 41, 48, 365 S.E.2d 202, 206, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385
(1988), and the supreme court did not consider this aspect of the court of appeals' decision.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988). Section 75-1.1, in pertinent part, provides, "[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. § 75-1.1(a).
16. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 564, 374 S.E.2d at 389.
A trial judge must award treble damages upon finding a violation of section 75-1.1. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-16 (1988). Section 75-16 provides:
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be
broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person,
firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or
corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if
damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
1226 [Vol. 67
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Defendants appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered
two issues: the sufficiency of the evidence of fraud, and the propriety of the trial
judge's instruction on gross negligence. 17 The court reversed on the fraud issue,
concluding that the language in the payment application made no representa-
tions of past or existing facts.1 8 Instead, the court characterized a statement to
the best of the maker's knowledge, information, and belief as merely a recom-
mendation or opinion that could never be actionable.1 9 The court of appeals
also found error in the jury instruction on gross negligence20 and remanded for a
new trial on that issue and for a redetermination of the section 75-1.1 claim.2 1
A unanimous supreme court sharply disagreed with the lower court's deter-
mination that the language of the payment application was not a representation
and could never be actionable. 22 Characterizing the application as a solemn
document designed to induce action, the court held that a contractor's sworn
statement "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief" could consti-
tute an actionable misrepresentation if the other elements of fraud were
proved.23
Id.
17. Myers & Chapman, 89 N.C. App. at 42, 365 S.E.2d at 203.
18. Id. at 45-46, 365 S.E.2d at 205.
19. Id. at 46, 365 S.E.2d at 205. The court of appeals relied on Myrtle Apartments, Inc. v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 258 N.C. 49, 127 S.E.2d 759 (1962). The representation at issue in
Myrtle Apartments was contained in a letter from defendant's engineer, who had inspected plaintiff's
boiler. The letter stated, "It is, therefore, recommended that this boiler be replaced .... Id. at 50,
127 S.E.2d at 760. Plaintiff sued, claiming that the boiler was in proper working order and that it
had been fraudulently induced to incur expenses for a new boiler. Id. at 49-50, 127 S.E.2d at 759-60.
The court held that a mere statement of opinion or belief cannot constitute fraud. Id. at 52, 127
S.E.2d at 761.
20. Myers & Chapman, 89 N.C. App. at 47, 365 S.E.2d at 206. The court of appeals found
error in the following instruction: "It is immaterial whether the defendants.., were cognizant of
the fact that the equipment was not stored as certified. The law charges them with actual knowledge
of the company's affairs and holds them responsible for damages sustained by others by reason of
their negligence, fraud or deceit." Id. The court of appeals also found error in the trial court's
omission of the following language:
Directors are not guarantors of the solvency of a corporation, nor are they insurers of
the honesty and integrity of the officers and agents. Neither are they required to personally
supervise all the details of business transactions.
Ordinarily, of course, directors would not be charged with notice by virtue of desul-
tory, occasional or disconnected acts of mismanagement or fraudulent transactions, but in
cases where 'mismanagement and fraud has been persistently and continuously practiced
for substantial periods of time a jury must determine whether the directors, in the exercise
of that degree of care which the law imposes, should have known of such practices and that
persons dealing with the corporation would be injured thereby.
Id. at 46-47, 365 S.E.2d at 205. The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals that the given
instruction was in error but held that the trial court properly omitted the other language. See infra
notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
21. Myers & Chapman, 89 N.C. App. at 47-48, 365 S.E.2d at 206.
22. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 565-66, 374 S.E.2d at 389-90. The court found the lan-
guage of the payment application to be "very different" from the engineer's letter in Myrtle Apart-
ments. Id. at 565, 374 S.E.2d at 389-90; see supra note 19.
23. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 565-66, 569-70, 374 S.E.2d at 390, 392. In finding the
payment application to constitute an actionable representation, the court relied heavily on an amicus
curiae brief filed by the Carolinas Branch of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc.
(AGC). Id. AGC argued that the standardized" document keeps down the overall cost of the pro-
ject, because the contractor can rely on the application without having to spend time and money
1989] 1227
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Justice Meyer, writing for the court, then considered whether the evidence
at trial was otherwise sufficient to support the jury's fraud verdict. He deter-
mined that plaintiff had offered insufficient proof of scienter, finding that
Thomas Evans' admitted ignorance of the truth of his statements did not estab-
lish that he knew the application was false or that he intended to deceive plain-
tiff.24 Nevertheless, the court found the same evidence sufficient to support the
gross negligence claim against Thomas Evans. 25 It agreed with the court of
appeals that the jury instruction on gross negligence was erroneous because it
suggested that directors and officers could be liable for damages to third parties
resulting from simple negligence. 2 6 The court remanded the case for a new trial
on the gross negligence issue.27 It did not agree, however, with the court of
appeals that the section 75-1.1 claim also should be remanded for redetermina-
tion. The court disposed of that issue in one sentence, stating that the deceptive
trade practices claim was baseless absent proof of fraud.2 8
I. CULPABLE IGNORANCE
The doctrine of culpable ignorance is a well-established method of proving
scienter in American common law.29 The doctrine is stated by one commenta-
tor as follows:
A defendant who asserts a fact as of his own knowledge, or so posi-
tively as to imply that he has knowledge, under circumstances where
he is aware that he will be so understood when he knows that he does
not in fact know whether what he says is true, is found to have the
intent to deceive, not so much as to the fact itself, but rather as to the
extent of his information.3 0
The state jurisdictions uniformly recognize this doctrine.3I
In North Carolina, the culpable ignorance doctrine was recognized in dicta
as early as 1907.32 A frequently cited statement of the doctrine appears in Zager
verifying work that may be outside his area of expertise. Id. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392; Amicus
Curiae Brief at 5. AGC also pointed out that the application protects the small subcontractor by
expediting payment and keeping him from having to finance the contractor. Myers & Chapman, 323
N.C. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392; Amicus Curiae Brief at 6.
24. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 566-69, 374 S.E.2d at 390-92.
25. Id. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392.
26. Id. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 394; see supra note 20; infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text,
27. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 573, 374 S.E.2d at 394.
28. Id.
29. See Cooper v. Schlesinger, 111 U.S. 148, 155 (1884); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§ 526(c) & comment f (1977).
30. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 742 (5th ed. 1984)
(footnotes omitted).
31. Id.; see, eg., Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thigpen, 448 So. 2d 314, 314 (Ala. 1984)
(representation made recklessly without knowledge); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 706, 682
P.2d 1247, 1253 (1983) (ignorance of representation's truth); Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 350
N.W.2d 149, 155 (Iowa 1984) (representation made in reckless disregard of truth or falsity); Os-
kenholt v. Lederle Laboratories, 294 Or. 213, 222, 656 P.2d 293, 299 (1982) (awareness of lack of
knowledge as to representation's truth or falsity).
32. Modlin v. Roanoke R. & Lumber Co., 145 N.C. 218, 225-26, 58 S.E. 1075, 1076 (1907).
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v. Setzer.33 Plaintiff in Zager owned a motion picture theater.3 4 While negotiat-
ing its sale to defendant, plaintiff represented that the theater's gross weekly
income under its previous operator had averaged between 600 and 700 dollars. 35
In truth, it had ranged from 222 to 487 dollars.3 6 When plaintiff sued to recover
the balance due on the sale contract, defendant counterclaimed for rescission
and damages from fraud.3 7 Defendant produced no evidence tending to show
that plaintiff knew of the former operator's actual gross income.38 The Zager
court held that this gap in the evidence would not bar recovery.3 9 The court
stated,
[T]he evidence is sufficient to support the inference that the plaintiff's
representation as to the gross weekly income of the former operator
was recklessly made, or positively averred when he was consciously
ignorant whether it was true or false, and was intended by him and
accepted by the defendant and reasonably relied on as a statement of
fact by which the defendant was deceived and caused to suffer loss.
The evidence tending to show this state of mind is an adequate substi-
tute for proof of scienter.4°
North Carolina courts have stated the culpable ignorance doctrine in various,
but substantively identical, verbal formulations both before and after the Zager
decision.4 1
In three cases decided in the 1980s, the supreme court incorporated the
culpable ignorance doctrine into its statement of the essential elements of a fraud
claim. Although Britt v. Britt,42 Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,43 and Odom v. Little Rock & 1-85 Corp. 44 use slightly different language, in
substance they all state the elements of fraud as follows:
1. Defendant represented a past or existing fact;
2. the representation was false;
3. defendant knew the representation was false when it was made or
made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive
assertion;
33. 242 N.C. 493, 88 S.E.2d 94 (1955).
34. Id. at 494, 88 S.E.2d at 95.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 494-95, 88 S.E.2d at 95.
37. Id. at 494, 88 S.E.2d at 95.
38. Id. at 495, 88 S.E.2d at 95.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. E.g., Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129, 133-34, 97 S.E.2d 881, 885 (1957); Roberson v.
Williams, 240 N.C. 696, 701, 83 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1954); Foster v. Snead, 235 N.C. 338, 339-40, 69
S.E.2d 604, 606 (1952); Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113, 63 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1951); Atkinson v.
Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232 N.C. 67, 68, 59 S.E.2d 1, 1-2 (1950); Ward v. Heath, 222 N.C. 470,
472-73, 24 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1943); Harding v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N.C. 129, 134, 10 S.E.2d
599, 601 (1940); Bell v. Harrison, 179 N.C. 190, 195-96, 102 S.E. 200, 203 (1920); Pate v. Blades,
163 N.C. 267, 272, 79 S.E. 608, 610 (1913); Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N.C. 273, 277, 62 S.E.
1067, 1068 (1908); Fulton v. Vickery, 73 N.C. App. 382, 388, 326 S.E.2d 354, 358, disc. rev. denied,
313 N.C. 599, 332 S.E.2d 178 (1985).
42. 320 N.C. 573, 359 S.E.2d 467 (1987).
43. 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
44. 299 N.C. 86, 261 S.E.2d 99 (1980).
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4. defendant made the false representation with the intent that it
should be relied on by plaintiffs;
5. plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation and acted upon it;
and
6. plaintiff suffered injury.45
This formulation of the elements of fraud, including the emphasized portions
concerning the culpable ignorance doctrine, is nearly identical to North Caro-
lina's standard pattern jury instruction for fraud.4 6 Both plaintiff and defend-
ants in Myers & Chapman requested instructions based on this formula.47
The facts of Myers & Chapman make out a paradigm case for the applica-
tion of the culpable ignorance doctrine as proof of scienter. The supreme court
held that the payment application was a representation. 48 The falsity of the
application was uncontested. Defendant Evans admitted that he had no per-
sonal knowledge upon which to base the statement.49 Evans submitted the ap-
plication with the intention that Myers & Chapman would make payment based
upon it.5 0 Myers & Chapman relied upon the application in making payment
and suffered a loss of more than 11,000 dollars.51
Nevertheless, the supreme court concluded that plaintiff failed to prove sci-
enter.5 2 The court held that scienter embraces both knowledge of falsity and an
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.5 3 The culpable ignorance doctrine, in
the court's view, sometimes may satisfy the element of knowledge of falsity,54
but intent to deceive requires additional proof of the defendant's state of mind.55
The court made no mention of Zager.5 6 It did expressly disavow Britt, Johnson
and Odom, however, concluding that they could be "interpreted to have ex-
45. See Britt, 320 N.C. at 579, 359 S.E.2d at 471; Johnson, 300 N.C. at 253, 266 S.E.2d at 615;
Odom, 299 N.C. at 91-92, 261 S.E.2d at 103.
46. NORTH CAROLINA PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 800.00 (1973).
47. Record at 21-22, 31-32.
48. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 565-66, 374 S.E.2d at 390.
49. Id. at 566-67, 374 S.E.2d at 390-91.
50. See id. at 565, 374 S.E.2d at 390.
51. Id. at 561-62, 374 S.E.2d at 388.
52. Id. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392.
53. Id. at 568, 374 S.E.2d at 391.
54. See id. The court held that even the knowledge-of-falsity element was not satisfied in the
Myers & Chapman case. Id. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392. The court pointed to the jury's negative
answer to Issue No. 4, which asked whether Thomas Evans submitted an application for payment
knowing it to be false. Id. at 567, 374 S.E.2d at 391. The jury did find in answering another issue,
however, that Evans had committed fraud. Id. at 562, 374 S.E.2d at 388. Neither party challenged
the verdict as inconsistent. See Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 11. The jury's answers regarding
fraud and knowledge can be reconciled by taking into account the instruction on culpable ignorance.
See Transcript at 269, Myers & Chapman (No. 140PA88). If the jury relied on this doctrine in the
verdict, it could have answered the fraud issue affirmatively and still found that Evans did not know
the application was false (or true) when he submitted it. The jury's answer to Issue No. 4, therefore,
is consistent with Evans' admission that he had no personal knowledge of the application's truth or
falsity. See Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 566-67, 374 S.E.2d at 390-91.
55. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 568, 374 S.E.2d at 391.
56. The Zager facts could be distinguished from those of Myers & Chapman in one respect.
The Zager theater owner offered no explanation for the basis of his misrepresentation, whereas Ev-
ans testified that he relied on a document prepared by Evans, Inc.'s project manager. The supreme
court made this distinction irrelevant, however, holding that the language of the payment applica-
tion implied first-hand knowledge by Evans as signatory. Id. at 571, 374 S.E.2d at 393.
[Vol. 671230
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panded the definition of fraud to the point where the essential element of the
defendant's intent to deceive is only implicitly recognized at best."'57 The court
endorsed the following statement of the elements of fraud: "'(1) False represen-
tation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3)
made with intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting in dam-
age to the injured party.' -58
The court's failure to recognize that earlier cases such as Zager allowed
proof of culpable ignorance alone to satisfy the element of scienter also pre-
vented it from explaining the worthwhile policies it hoped to advance through
the change. None is immediately apparent. Before the change, fraud plaintiffs
bore a heavy burden of proof. Now that burden will be even heavier in many
circumstances. 59 Intent is not readily susceptible to proof in any area of the
law.60 A defendant rarely announces the true nature of his intentions. Most
often, intent must be inferred from the circumstances. 6 1 The culpable ignorance
doctrine represents a specialized application of the well-known principle that
intent must be judged from the circumstances of the action.62 Without resort to
the doctrine, many otherwise meritorious fraud claims will fail for lack of proof
of deceptive intent whenever the defendant testifies, and the jury believes, that he
was ignorant of the falsity of his representation. The Myers & Chapman court's
abandonment of the culpable ignorance doctrine allows the party in the best
position to investigate the facts relevant to a transaction to refrain from doing
57. Id. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392.
58. Id. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 391 (quoting Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d
494, 500 (1974)). Defendants in the Ragsdale case counterclaimed for fraud in an action on a note
they had executed to secure payment for stock in a corporation. Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at 137, 209
S.E.2d at 499. Plaintiff, president and general manager of the corporation at the time of the sale, had
represented the business as a "gold mine" and a "going concern" when the corporation's working
capital and income were actually insufficient to meet normal operating expenses. Id. at 137-38, 209
S.E.2d at 499-500. From these facts, the court inferred that plaintiff knew his statements were false.
Id. at 139, 209 S.E.2d at 501. Thus the Ragsdale case did not reject the culpable ignorance doctrine;
its facts merely did not present the issue.
Three other cases upon which the court relies in requiring independent proof of deceptive in-
tent, see Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 568, 374 S.E.2d at 391, actually recognize the culpable
ignorance doctrine. See Foster v. Snead, 235 N.C. 338, 339-40, 69 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1952); Vail v.
Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113, 63 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1951); Ward v. Heath, 222 N.C. 470, 472-73, 24 S.E.2d
5, 8 (1943). The strongest statement of the doctrine appears in Ward:
It is well recognized with us that under certain conditions and circumstances if a party to a
bargain avers the existence of a material fact recklessly or affirms its existence positively
when he is consciously ignorant whether it be true or false he must be held responsible for a
falsehood.
Ward, 222 N.C. at 473, 24 S.E.2d at 8.
59. See supra text accompanying note 45 for a statement of the six elements plaintiff had to
prove to make out a prima facie case of fraud.
60. See W. KEETON, supra note 30, § 8, at 33-37.
61. Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REv. 583, 584 (1958).
North Carolina courts have recognized the difficulty of proving intent by direct evidence, both in the
context of fraud and in other areas of the law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300
N.C. 247, 260, 266 S.E.2d 610, 619 (1980) (fraud); State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506,
508 (1974) (first-degree burglary).
62. See Keeton, supra note 61, at 592-98. The intent to be inferred from the defendant's igno-
rant representation in a culpable ignorance case is the intent to conceal the extent of his knowledge.
See supra text accompanying note 30. The ignorant representation, however, would only be actiona-
ble if it turned out to be false.
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so, secure in the knowledge that he can make statements in ignorance and even
gain an advantage. If he does not know the truth of a statement, he also cannot
know its falsity. Thus he cannot intend to deceive. While some other remedy,
such as an action for negligent misrepresentation, 63 may be available to the vic-
tim of an ignorant falsehood, Myers & Chapman at minimum forecloses the pos-
sibility of punitive damages. 64 A negligence remedy, for which only
compensatory damages are recoverable, likely will prove to be an inadequate
deterrent to ignorant misrepresentations. When a solvent contracting business
ignorantly and mistakenly certifies that work has been completed, it no doubt
will complete the work eventually. Compensatory damages in a case such as
this will be minimal-probably not worth the expense of litigation. The negli-
gent contractor nevertheless has gained the advantage of use of the money before
he was entitled to it under the terms of the contract.
The outcome of this case is particularly troubling for the construction in-
dustry. The Carolinas Branch of Associated General Contractors of America,
Inc. (AGC), as amicus curiae, asked the supreme court to reverse the holding
that the construction industry's form application for payment could never be an
actionable representation. 65 In its brief, AGC predicted that the court of ap-
peals' holding, if left undisturbed, would result in construction delays and higher
costs. 6 6 By recognizing the form application as an actionable representation but
nevertheless holding that an ignorant submission cannot be fraudulent, the
supreme court has given comfort to the construction industry with one hand and
taken it away with the other. If contractors can tender their payment applica-
tions in ignorance, risking nothing more than the actual cost of their errors,
67
the same problems arise. Each party to a construction transaction must under-
take independent investigation of the work completed by those below them in
the contracting chain, "result[ing] in construction delays and higher costs, bur-
dens that will be ultimately borne by the consuming public." 6
8
The North Carolina Supreme Court clearly rejected culpable ignorance as
sufficient proof of intent to deceive. 69 It expressly overruled three cases that, in
its view, gave inadequate emphasis to that aspect of scienter. 70 The policies un-
derlying this emphasis on clear proof of deceptive intent remain puzzling, how-
63. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing general availability of this
remedy).
64. Punitive damages are recoverable in North Carolina only upon a showing of malicious,
willful or wanton conduct. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 27, 92 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1956). Because
fraud by its very nature involves intentional wrongdoing, proof of fraud automatically entitles plain-
tiff to submission of a punitive damages claim to the jury. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291
N.C. 105, 113-14, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976). A negligent, or even a grossly negligent, misrepresen-
tation, however, is insufficient for punitive damages absent proof of some other outrageous or aggra-
vated conduct. See Hinson, 244 N.C. at 27-28, 92 S.E.2d at 396-97.
65. Amicus Curiae Brief at 6.
66. Id. at 5-6.
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
68. Amicus Curiae Brief at 6, Myers & Chapman (No. 140PA88).
69. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 568, 374 S.E.2d at 391; see supra notes 52-55 and accompa-
nying text.
70. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 391-92; see supra note 57 and accompa-
nying text.
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ever. The court should revisit this issue soon to explain its determination that
statements by know-nothings will be countenanced along with statements by
those in the know. 7 1
II. TORT LIABILITY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
The Myers & Chapman court acknowledged that Thomas Evans' payment
application, while falling short of intentional fraud, still could be actionable
under a negligence theory.72 Nevertheless, the court set aside that portion of the
judgment as well, stating that the trial court's instructions impermissibly permit-
ted the jury to find Evans liable for simple negligence. 73 The court's reasoning
was based, not on the essential elements of the tort, but on the standard of care
applicable to those acting on behalf of a corporation. 74 As a result, the agents of
a corporation enjoy greater protection from liability, at least as regards the tort
of negligent misrepresentation, 75 than do individuals who speak on their own
behalf.
North Carolina recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation as de-
scribed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.76 Section 552 states:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transac-
tions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reason-
able care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information. 77
The tort has a more restricted reach than fraud, requiring that the defendant
know the use to which his statement is to be put and to intend to supply it for
that purpose. 78 The Restatement makes clear, however, that corporate officers
71. In the portion of the Myers & Chapman opinion recognizing possible liability under a gross
negligence theory, the court made clear that it did not endorse Thomas Evans' conduct. "If the
applicant truly has no knowledge, he should refrain from certifying that the work has been done."
Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 571, 374 S.E.2d at 393. To put that admonition in proper perspec-
tive, it is important to realize that in allowing individual liability for corporate officers who make
grossly negligent misrepresentations, the court is only expanding the number of individuals who may
be held liable, not the total amount of liability. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
72. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392.
73. Id. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 393-94.
74. See id. at 570-73, 374 S.E.2d at 392-94.
75. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
76. Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 214, 367 S.E.2d 609,
617 (1988); Powell v. Wold, 88 N.C. App. 61, 67-68; 362 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1988); Howell v. Fisher,
49 N.C. App. 488, 497, 272 S.E.2d 19, 25 (1980), disc. rev. denied, 302 N.C. 218, 277 S.E.2d 69
(1981). North Carolina courts have applied the negligent misrepresentation tort to transactions in-
volving accountants, e.g., Raritan, 322 N.C. at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617, real estate agents, eg., Ness v.
Jones, 89 N.C. App. 504, 505-07, 366 S.E.2d 570, 571-72 (1988); Powell, 88 N.C. App. at 67-68, 362
S.E.2d at 799, developers, eg., Stanford v. Owens, 76 N.C. App. 284, 286, 332 S.E.2d 730, 731, disc.
rev,. denied, 314 N.C. 670, 336 S.E.2d 402 (1985), and soil analysts, e.g., Howell, 49 N.C. App. at
494, 272 S.E.2d at 24; Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 668-
69, 255 S.E.2d 580, 585, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 911 (1979).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
78. Id. § 552 comment a.
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can be liable to thid parties if they are merely negligent in making representa-
tions on behalf of the corporation. 79
The general rule in North Carolina holds a corporate director or officer
individually liable to third parties for any tort she commits, even though the
tortious actions are taken on behalf of the corporation. 80 A separate basis of
liability exists when she breaches her duty of care in supervising corporate
agents and those agents then injure third parties.8 ' The key factor distinguish-
ing these alternate bases of liability is the officer or director's active participation
in the injurious act.82
In Palomino Mills, Inc. v. Davidson Mills Corp. 83 the North Carolina
Supreme Court considered a claim against the president of a corporation who
had signed a fraudulent bill of sale.8 4 The court held that because the president
had actively participated in the transaction, he would be jointly and severally
liable with the corporation.8 5 Although Palomino Mills concerned intentional
fraud, the language of the case applies the principle of joint and several liability
for an actively participating corporate officer to negligent torts as well.
86
The Palomino Mills court relied on dicta from Minnis v. Sharpe,8 7 a case
that came before the court three times. Defendants in Minnis were directors of a
lending corporation.88 The lender's corporate officers had induced plaintiffs to
execute multiple deeds of trust to secure what had been represented as single
mortgages on their property. 89 When the multiple creditors demanded pay-
ment, plaintiffs sued the lending corporation's directors, alleging that they were
negligent and reckless in delegating control of the corporation to the managing
79. Id. § 552 comments d & e.
80. Palomino Mills v. Davidson Mills Corp., 230 N.C. 286, 292, 52 S.E.2d 915, 919 (1949);
Esteel Co. v. Goodman, 82 N.C. App. 692, 697, 348 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1986), disc. rev. denied, 318
N.C. 693, 351 S.E.2d 745 (1987). A director or officer's liability to third parties should be distin-
guished from her liability to the corporation. This Note will deal only with liability to third parties.
For a general discussion of directors' and officers' liability to the corporation and its shareholders,
see R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 12-2 to -7, 13-12 (3d
ed. 1983).
81. Air Traffic Conference v. Marina Travel, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 179, 183, 316 S.E.2d 642, 644-
45 (1984).
82. Peed v. Burleson's, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 441, 94 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1956); Palomino Mills, 230
N.C. at 292, 52 S.E.2d at 919; Cone v. United Fruit Growers' Ass'n, 171 N.C. 530, 531, 88 S.E. 860,
861 (1916); Esteel Co., 82 N.C. App. at 697-98, 348 S.E.2d at 157; Air Traffic Conference, 69 N.C.
App. at 182-83, 316 S.E.2d at 644-45.
83. 230 N.C. 286, 52 S.E.2d 915 (1949).
84. Id. at 292, 52 S.E.2d at 919. Plaintiff buyer sued the seller corporation and its president in
state court. The corporate defendant sought removal to federal court and claimed misjoinder of the
corporate president, a North Carolina resident. Id. at 289, 52 S.E.2d at 917. The trial judge denied
the removal petition, and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the president properly was joined
because he had actively participated. Id. at 292-93, 52 S.E.2d at 919-20.
85. Id. at 291-93, 52 S.E.2d at 918-20.
86. Id. at 293, 52 S.E.2d at 920 ("if a party to a bargain avers the existence of a material fact
recklessly, or affirms its existence positively, when he is consciously ignorant whether it be true or
false, he may be held responsible for a falsehood").
87. Minnis v. Sharpe (Minnis 1), 198 N.C. 364, 151 S.E. 735 (1930); Minnis v. Sharpe (Minnis
Ir), 202 N.C. 300, 162 S.E. 606, rev'd in part, 203 N.C. 110, 164 S.E. 625 (1932) (Minnis 111).
88. Minnis II, 202 N.C. at 302, 162 S.E. at 607. Officers of the corporation also were named as
defendants, but they were not parties to the appeals. See infra notes 90 & 93 and accompanying text.
89. Minnis II, 202 N.C. at 301, 162 S.E. at 606.
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officers. 90 Plaintiffs offered strong evidence at trial that the managing officers'
scheme had been in operation for eight years. 91 The directors, although not
actively participating in the scheme, had failed to discover the wrongdoing.92
After a jury verdict for plaintiffs, the directors appealed the gross negligence
judgment.93
In Minnis i94 the court affirmed the judgment against the directors, hold-
ing that the evidence of mismanagement and fraud, "persistently and continu-
ously practiced for substantial periods of time," was sufficient to submit the
gross negligence claim to the jury.95 The court explained the standard of care
for nonparticipating directors as follows:
Directors are not guarantors of the solvency of a corporation, nor
are they insurers of the honesty and integrity of the officers and agents.
Neither are they required to personally supervise all the details of busi-
ness transactions. ... "Directors and managing officers of a corpora-
tion are deemed by law to be trustees, or quasi-trustees, in respect to
the performance of their official duties incident to corporate manage-
ment and are therefore liable for either wilful or negligent failure to
perform their official duties."... To the same tenor is the principle
... "that the directors are liable for gross neglect of their duties, and
mismanagement-though not for errors of judgment made in good
faith-as well as for fraud and deceit." '96
Thus, nonparticipating directors can be held liable to third-party victims of a
corporate agent's misrepresentations only for gross negligence in corporate
management. 97
The facts of Palomino Mills closely paralleled those of Myers & Chapman.
Thomas Evans personally signed the false payment application on behalf of his
corporation. 9 8 Thus Evans was an active participant in the alleged wrongdoing.
Plaintiff extensively briefed Palomino Mills,99 but the court made no mention of
90. Id. Minnis I concerned the directors' demurrer to the complaint. The court approved the
trial judge's overruling of the demurrer, stating, "Where third persons are injured by a wrong done
by the corporation, the corporation can act only by officers or agents, hence third persons should be
entitled to recover from the officers or agents who are wrongdoers." Minnis I, 198 N.C. at 367, 151
S.E. at 737. Because plaintiffs had alleged that the directors failed to exercise a proper degree of care
to discover the wrongdoing of the managing officers, the court concluded that plaintiffs had stated a
claim against the directors. Id. at 368-69, 151 S.E. at 737-38. The managing officers, who also were
named as defendants, did not demur; the complaint alleged that they had actively participated in
misappropriating plaintiff's assets. Id. at 365-66, 151 S.E. at 736.
91. Minnis 11, 202 N.C. at 301, 162 S.E. at 606.
92. Id. at 302, 162 S.E. at 607.
93. Id. The managing officers were not parties to the Minnis 11 appeal. The Minnis 1I opinion
does not indicate clearly whether the participating officers were found liable at trial.
94. 202 N.C. 300, 162 S.E. 606, rev'd in part, 203 N.C. 110, 164 S.E. 625 (1932).
95. Id. at 303, 162 S.E. at 607.
96. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Harnett County Trust Co., 192 N.C. 246, 248, 134
S.E. 656, 657 (1926); Caldwell v. Bates, 118 N.C. 323, 325, 24 S.E. 481, 482 (1896)).
97. The last phrase of the aforementioned quotation from Minnis 11--"as well as for fraud and
deceit"--clearly envisions individual liability for directors and officers who are active tortfeasors.
This is dictum, however, since the plaintiffs admitted that the Minnis directors did not participate in
the fraud. Minnis 11, 202 N.C. at 302, 162 S.E. at 607.
98. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 571, 374 S.E.2d at 393.
99. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 15-16.
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it and instead relied heavily on the inapposite Minnis cases. 10
The Myers & Chapman court recognized that the Minnis cases concerned
the liability of nonparticipating directors for their gross neglect in permitting
tortious acts by corporate agents and employees.101 The court also recognized
that the Myers & Chapman case presented it with a different set of facts: "Here,
defendants were being sued for their own alleged personal misrepresentations,
not the alleged misrepresentations of their project manager. The representations
made... were those of Thomas Evans."' 1 2 Despite this recognition, the court
held the following jury instruction to be erroneous: "It is immaterial whether
the defendants.., were cognizant of the fact that the equipment was not stored
as certified. The law charges them with actual knowledge of the company's af-
fairs and holds them responsible for damages sustained by others by reason of
their negligence, fraud or deceit."' 0 3 The court regarded this instruction as er-
roneous "because it suggested to the jury that directors and managing officers
are chargeable with an omniscient knowledge of the company's affairs and are
liable for damages to third parties resulting from simple negligence. This is not
the law of North Carolina.''04
The law of North Carolina before Myers & Chapman did indeed hold direc-
tors and officers individually liable whenever they were active tortfeasors,
whether negligently or intentionally.10 5 The court's concern that the instruction
charged directors and officers with omniscient knowledge appears to be the key
rationale for its decision. 10 6 Imputing constructive knowlege of all wrongdoing
by corporate agents certainly would impose an onerous burden on directors and
officers in today's complex corporate world.' 0 7 The law as it stood before Myers
& Chapman protected corporate leaders from any requirement of omniscience.
The participant-nonparticipant distinction served this purpose.10 8 Had Evans'
project manager signed the application for payment, there would be no basis for
100. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 570-72, 374 S.E.2d at 392-94.
101. Id. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 393. The court misspoke by labeling this principle a type of
vicarious liability. See id. Vicarious liability, most often called respondeat superior, imposes liability
in damages upon an innocent employer for the torts of an employee acting in the course and scope of
his employment. See W. KEETON, supra note 30, §§ 69-70. The liability at issue in the Minnis cases
was based on fault.
102. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 393.
103. Id. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 393-94. This instruction, requested by plaintiff, Record at 24, is a
paraphrase from dicta in Minnis I dealing with the liability of directors and officers who are active
tortfeasors. See Minnis I, 198 N.C. at 368, 151 S.E.2d at 737.
104. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 394.
105. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing Palomino Mills and its imposition
of liability on active corporate tortfeasors).
106. See Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 394.
107. The court of appeals shared the supreme court's concern that directors and officers not be
held accountable for omniscient knowledge:
A corporate contractor may have dozens of agents in his employ, dispersed at sundry work
sites scattered over a wide geographical area. A project site may be hundreds of miles from
the home office. Directors and corporate management must rely, and our settled law per-
mits them reasonably to rely, on their agents and employees.
Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 89 N.C. App. 41, 47, 365 S.E.2d 202, 205, aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
108. See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
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holding Evans individually liable. 10 9 Evans, however, signed the application
himself, in ignorance of its truth. 110 As the court correctly noted, "If the appli-
cant truly has no knowledge, he should refrain from certifying that the work has
been done."111 Evans himself made a false certification, thereby becoming an
active participant in tortious conduct.1 12 Active negligence, not omniscience, is
the issue.
As the law now stands, corporate officers and directors are liable to third
parties for their statements on behalf of the corporation only if the representa-
tion is grossly negligent or fraudulent. The question remains whether the gross
negligence standard of care applies to other torts committed by a corporate
leader on behalf of the corporation. 1 3 The posture of Myers & Chapman as
pleaded and tried suggests a negative answer to this question. Plaintiff sued on a
theory of gross, not simple, negligence. 114 At trial, plaintiff requested and re-
ceived a jury instruction based on the language from Minnis I1 that defines the
duty of care required of an officer or director who was not a participant in the
wrongdoing.' 1 5 The nature of plaintiff's claim made it simple for the court to
adopt the gross negligence standard for a corporate leader's nonfraudulent rep-
resentations without elaborating on the proper standard of care for other torts
committed on behalf of the corporation. When faced with the case of a corpo-
rate officer whose careless driving while on business in a company car causes an
automobile accident, however, the court most likely will hold him liable for sim-
ple negligence.
The court nonetheless may have intended to raise the threshold of liability
in another category of torts that corporate officers are likely to commit. Defend-
ants urged the court to adopt a good-faith exception to the general rule that
corporate officers and directors are individually liable for torts committed by
them on behalf of the corporation.' 16 This exception is recognized in other ju-
109. The evidence at trial from both plaintiff and defendants indicated that Evans' project man-
ager was trustworthy. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 570, 374 S.E.2d at 392. Therefore, this
misrepresentation would be the sort of isolated incident that would be insufficient for a finding of
gross negligence on the part of a nonparticipating officer. See Minnis II, 202 N.C. at 303, 162 S.E.2d
at 607.
110. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 566-67, 374 S.E.2d at 390-91.
111. Id. at 571, 374 S.E.2d at 393.
112. Evans' conduct clearly falls within the tort of negligent misrepresentation as it is recognized
in the Restatement. See supra text accompanying note 77. Evans was acting in the course of his
employment as president of Evans, Inc. when he supplied false information for the guidance of
plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss when it paid Evans, Inc. for nonexistent equipment in
reliance upon the payment application, which Evans had prepared. Whether Evans failed to exercise
reasonable care in preparing the application is a question the jury answered in the affirmative. See
Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 563, 374 S.E.2d at 388.
113. The court did not expressly limit its language to torts based on representations. See Myers
& Chapman, 323 N.C. at 572, 374 S.E.2d at 393-94. Similar language in the court of appeals' opin-
ion caused plaintiff's counsel to conclude that the gross negligence standard governed the liability of
corporate leaders for their accidents as well as their representations. See Plaintiff-Appellant's New
Brief at 16.
114. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 17. The record and briefs filed in the case provide no
clue to explain plaintiff's choice of gross negligence as its theory.
115. Record at 23-25; Transcript at 270-72. For the pertinent language from Minnis II, see
supra text accompanying note 96.
116. Defendant-Appellees' New Brief at 28-29, Myers & Chapman (No. 140PA88).
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risdictions, particularly New York.1 17 The good-faith exception applies only
when the officer or director was acting solely for the benefit of the corpora-
tion. 11 8 If he were pursuing some personal benefit, he would still be liable.'1 9 A
good-faith defense makes most sense when a corporation, through the actions of
its officers, breaches a contract.120 When a corporate leader gains no personal
benefit from the breach, holding him individually liable for tortious interference
with contract may be unduly harsh. Imposing individual liability for the merely
negligentl 21 misrepresentation of a corporate actor who has no personal stake in
the transaction arguably carries the same element of harshness.' 22
If the North Carolina Supreme Court had the good-faith exception in mind
when it decided Myers & Chapman, it should have stated it explicitly. The court
has done a disservice to the state's corporate officers and directors by further
muddying this vague area of the law. 123 Corporate leaders now must carry out
their duties without certainty as to the extent of their individual liability. Until
the court choses to elaborate on its reasoning, however, the result of Myers &
Chapman provides authority that North Carolina holds directors and officers to
a lower standard of care for a category of torts they may commit on behalf of the
corporation. 124
III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or decep-
tive acts and practices that affect commerce.1 25 Section 75-16 gives persons in-
117. See A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 378, 144 N.E.2d 371, 377, 165
N.Y.S.2d 475, 483 (1957) (officer who induces corporation to breach contract with third party not
liable unless his conduct constitutes a separate tortious act); see also R. ROBINSON, supra note 80,
§ 13-13, at 206-07 (noting North Carolina Supreme Court has not considered good-faith exception).
118. R. ROBINSON, supra note 80, § 13-13, at 207.
119. R. ROBINSON, supra note 80, § 13-13, at 207.
120. R. ROBINSON, supra note 80, § 13-13, at 206.
121. A corporate officer or director who has grossly neglected his duty to ascertain the truth of
his representations cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
122. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment d (1977) ("the officers of a
corporation, although they receive no personal consideration for giving information concerning its
affairs, may have a pecuniary interest in its transactions, since they stand to profit indirectly from
them").
Thomas Evans arguably benefitted personally from the false payment application. Three
months after receipt of the overpayment, Evans decided to wind up his business. Myers & Chapman,
323 N.C. at 562, 374 S.E.2d at 388. As the sole shareholder, Evans would have received all of the
corporation's assets upon dissolution.
123. See R. ROBINSON, supra note 80, § 13-13, at 206. The Myers & Chapman defendants ar-
gued that Minnis 11 implicitly recognized the good-faith exception. Defendant-Appellees' New Brief
at 28-29. The language of Minnis I1, 202 N.C. at 303, 162 S.E. at 607 (directors are not liable for
errors of judgment made in good faith), however, is a statement of the business judgment rule, which
protects directors from liability to the corporation and its shareholders. See R. ROBINSON, supra
note 80, § 12-6, at 178.
124. An exploration of which torts fall into this category is beyond the scope of this Note. It is
reasonable to conclude, however, that courts will not apply a gross negligence standard to torts
committed by directors or officers involving physical injury to persons or property. But see supra
note 113 (Myers & Chapman plaintiff concluding otherwise).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988). For the text of the relevant subsection of the statute, see
supra note 15. This Note does not address the unfair competition aspects of section 75-1.1. For a
recent discussion of the statute as it applies to unfair methods of competition between businesses, see
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jured by a violation of section 75-1.1 a private right of action and an automatic
treble damages remedy. 126 In the years following the adoption of the statute,
North Carolina courts considered proof of intent or bad faith to be an essential
element of a claim under section 75-1.1.127 In Marshall v. Miller,128 however,
the supreme court held that the intent or good faith of the actor is irrelevant to
proof of a violation of section 75-1.1.129 The Marshall decision prompted an
outcry in the state, and critics charged that the court's expanded application of
section 75-1.1 left the statute unconstitutionally vague, at least as applied to
actions sounding in contract between sophisticated commercial parties.130 The
supreme court never has addressed directly the constitutionality of section 75-
1.1, despite at least one opportunity to do so. 13 1 The court's one-sentence dispo-
sition of the Myers & Chapman plaintiff's section 75-1.1 claim,132 however, can
be interpreted as a silent concession that its Marshall decision impermissibly
extended the reach of the statute.
Plaintiffs in Marshall sued the owner-operator of a mobile home park for
breach of agreements to lease lots and sell mobile homes, alleging that defendant
had promised to provide a variety of facilities and services that never material-
ized. 133 The trial judge concluded that defendant's misrepresentations were un-
McDonald v. Scarboro, 91 N.C. App. 13, 18-21, 370 S.E.2d 680, 683-85, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C.
476, 373 S.E.2d 864 (1988).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988). For the text of this statute, see supra note 16. After the
jury finds the facts in a case, the trial judge determines as a matter of law whether the defendant's
actions constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310, 281
S.E.2d 342, 346-47 (1975). If a violation is found, the trial judge has no discretion but must treble
the damages pursuant to section 75-16. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402
(1981).
127. E.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 44 N.C. App. 685, 691, 262 S.E.2d 646, 650,
disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 379, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980), overruled by Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539,
276 S.E.2d 397 (1981); Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 517, 239 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1977), disc.
rev. denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978); see also, e.g., United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (federal court in diversity examining sec-
tion 75-1.1), aff'd, 649 F.2d 984 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981).
128. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981) (Meyer, J., for a unanimous court).
129. Id. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
130. See, e.g., Farr, Unfair and Deceptive Legislation: The Case for Finding North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes Section 75-L1 Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to an Alledged [sic] Breach of a
Commercial Contract, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 421 (1986). Farr argues that the language of section
75-1.1 is impermissibly vague on its face. Id. at 426-27. In his view, cases construing it as requiring
no elaboration and as delegating to trial judges the responsibility for applying it on a case-by-case
basis do not allieviate the vagueness. See id. Additionally, he argues, cases construing section
5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982) [hereinafter FTC Act],
upon which section 75-1.1 is based, provide no cure to the statute's constitutional infirmity. Farr,
supra, at 430. Because the FTC Act is strictly remedial and can be enforced only by the Federal
Trade Commission in civil cease and desist actions, Farr contends that cases brought under it are
inapposite to actions brought under section 75-1.1, which is at least partly penal. Id. at 431-32.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also has noted that the language of section 75-1.1 "is
extremely broad, so broad and vague, indeed, as to render the triple damage penalty provided by
G.S. 75-16 in a private action brought for violation of the vague language of G.S. 75-1.1 at least of
questionable validity." Hammers v. Lowe's Cos., 48 N.C. App. 150, 154, 268 S.E.2d 257, 260
(1980). Finding no violation, however, the Hammers court did not attempt to resolve the constitu-
tional question. Id.
131. See Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987), dis-
cussed infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
132. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 573, 374 S.E.2d at 394.
133. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 540, 276 S.E.2d at 398.
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fair or deceptive acts in violation of section 75-1.1 and trebled the damages. 134
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge, holding that bad
faith must be shown to make out a valid section 75-1.1 claim.' 35 The supreme
court disagreed, concluding that the general assembly intended to provide relief
whenever an act or practice is unfair or has a tendency to deceive. 136 According
to the supreme court, "the intent of the actor is irrelevant. Good faith is equally
irrelevant. What is relevant is the effect of the actor's conduct on the consuming
public." 137
The court's emphasis on the effect of deceptive practices on consumers
caused a federal district court to conclude that section 75-1.1 could not apply to
alleged breaches of service contracts between businesses. Bunting v. Perdue,
Inc. 138 centered on the termination of a contract that required plaintiff to raise
to maturity baby chicks owned by defendant.' 39 Plaintiff sued for breach of
contract and violation of federal and state statutes, including section 75-1.1.140
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
dismissed plaintiff's section 75-1.1 claim, holding that the statute's protections
were limited to individual consumers. 141 Although the court took note of the
debate over the constitutionality of applying section 75-1.1 to unintentional vio-
lations in a commercial, as opposed to a consumer, context, it elected to limit the
application of the statute in lieu of reaching the constitutional question.142
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found the federal court's reasoning
134. Id. at 541, 276 S.E.2d at 398-99.
135. Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542-43, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), aff'd as modified,
302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
136. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403. The court reaffirmed the definitions of sec-
tion 75-1.I's terms announced a year earlier in Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247,
266 S.E.2d 610 (1980), relying heavily on cases construing the FTC Act. An unfair practice "offends
established public policy," or is "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially inju-
rious to consumers," or "amounts to an inequitable assertion of... power or position." Id. at 263-
64, 266 S.E.2d at 621-22. An act or practice is deceptive whenever it has "the capacity or tendency
to deceive.... In determining whether a representation is deceptive, its effect on the average con-
sumer is considered." Id. at 265-66, 266 S.E.2d at 622.
Drawing on the Johnson case, the Marshall court went on to enunciate the overall purpose of
the treble damages remedy. The court concluded,
[S]tate statutes such as ours were enacted to supplement federal legislation, so that local
business interests could not proceed with impunity, secure in the knowledge that the
dimensions of their transgression would not merit federal action. Given the small dollar
amounts often involved in such suits, statutory provision for treble damages found in G.S.
75-16 serves two purposes. First, it makes more economically feasible the bringing of an
action where the possibile money damages are limited, and thus encourages private en-
forcement. Second, it increases the incentive for reaching a settlement.
Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04 (citations omitted).
137. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 376 S.E.2d at 403.
138. 611 F. Supp. 682 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
139. Id. at 683-84.
140. Id. at 683.
141. Id. at 691-92. Because the contract did not involve the sale of any chicks, the court ex-
plained, "Plaintiff certainly cannot be characterized as a 'consumer,' and thereby deserving of the
statute's protection." Id.
142. Id. at 691.
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unpersuasive a year later in Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc. 143 and
held that the remedy provided under section 75-1.1 was not limited to consum-
ers.144 Olivetti sued to collect a debt incurred pursuant to a distributorship
agreement, and defendant counterclaimed for fraud and violation of section 75-
1.1.145 The trial court entered judgment for Olivetti on the debt and for defend-
ant on the fraud and section 75-1.1 counterclaims. 146 The court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that the statutory language as well as prior case law clearly
indicated that individual consumers are not the only ones provided a remedy
under sections 75-1.1 and 75-16.147 The court also concluded that the statute
was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, since the language of
section 75-1.1 "provides adequate notice that conduct constituting fraud is pro-
hibited." 1 48 The supreme court reversed the judgment in favor of the defend-
ant's counterclaim, concluding that defendant had failed to prove that it was
damaged by Olivetti's misrepresentations. 14 9 Because there were no damages
143. 81 N.C. App. 1, 344 S.E.2d 82 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 319 N.C. 534, 356
S.E.2d 578 (1987).
144. Id. at 22-23, 344 S.E.2d at 94-95. The court noted that plaintiff had relied primarily on the
federal court's analysis in Bunting, see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text, in arguing that
section 75-1.1 should be limited to consumers and should not be applied to a distributor-dealer
relationship. Olivetti, 81 N.C. App. at 23, 344 S.E.2d at 95. The court of appeals found Bunting to
be "distinguishable and unpersuasive on this issue and certainly not controlling on this court." Id.
145. Olivetti at 3-4, 344 S.E.2d at 84.
146. Id. at 12-13, 344 S.E.2d at 88-89. The judgment illustrates the effect section 75-1.1's treble
damages remedy can have in commercial disputes. The trial court ordered defendant to pay Olivetti
$57,800 and to return nine computers or pay the purchase price. Id. at 13, 344 S.E.23 at 89. De-
fendant, however, was awarded $406,200 as compensation for lost profits, trebled to $1,218,600
pursuant to section 75-16. Id.
147. Id. at 23, 344 S.E.2d at 94-95. The court of appeals relied on the purpose clause of section
75-1.1 as originally enacted, which stated:
The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain,
ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and between persons
engaged in business and the consuming public within this State, to the end that good faith
and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this state.
Id. at 22, 344 S.E.2d at 94 (quoting Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930,
930, amended by Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 747 §§ 1-2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988))). For a discussion of the effects of the 1977 amend-
ments, see Comment, Trade Regulation-The North Carolina Consumer Protection Act of 1977, 56
N.C.L. REv. 547 (1978).
The court also relied on a case it had decided just three months previously. In Concrete Serv.
Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 340 S.E.2d 755, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346
S.E.2d 137 (1986), the court explicitly held that businesses are within the protection of the statute,
even when the wrongdoing falls short of fraud. Id. at 685-86, 340 S.E.2d at 760. Subsequent cases
reflect the court of appeals' view that section 75-1.1 broadly applies to interbusiness disputes that do
not involve fraud. See Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co., 89 N.C. App. 649, 656,
266 S.E.2d 907, 912 (upholding judgment that corporate defendant violated section 75-1.1 while
finding no error in directed verdict for defendant on corporate plaintiff's fraud claim), aff'd, 323
N.C. 620, 374 S.E.2d 116 (1988) (per curiam); La Notte, Inc., v. New Way Gourmet, Inc., 83 N.C.
App. 480, 485-86, 350 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1986) (purchaser corporation entitled to jury determination
of facts underlying section 75-1.1 claim against vendor corporation, even though jury had found no
fraud), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 319 N.C. 459, 354 S.E.2d 888 (1987); see also Jennings Glass
Co., v. Brummer, 88 N.C. App. 44, 52, 362 S.E.2d 578, 583 (1987) (plaintiff glass contractor entitled
to treble damages pursuant to section 75-1.1 upon proof that it had been defrauded by individual
customer), disc, rev. denied, 321 N.C. 473, 364 S.E.2d 921 (1988).
148. Olivetti, 81 N.C. App. at 24, 344 S.E.2d at 95.
149. Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., 319 N.C. 534, 549, 356 S.E.2d 578, 587 (1987). For a
discussion of the damages issues raised in Olivetti, see Note, Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys-
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that could be trebled, the court stated, "We need not reach the question of
whether Chapter 75 applies to this transaction."150 This language leaves un-
resolved both whether section 75-1.1 protects only individual consumers and, if
not, whether businesses injured by conduct short of fraud or bad faith constitu-
tionally can invoke its treble damages remedy.
Myers & Chapman provided the supreme court with a perfect opportunity
to settle both of these questions.15 1 Plaintiff was a general contractor, not a con-
sumer. The supreme court concluded that Evans' false certification that the spe-
cialty items had been purchased and stored was sufficient to support a jury
finding of gross negligence.' 52 Such grossly negligent certifications fall well
within the scope of unfair and deceptive trade practices as previously defined by
the court. 15 3 Furthermore, the jury's unchallenged findings that defendants'
conduct was "in commerce" and misled or deceived plaintiff provided an in-
dependent basis for the trial judge's determination that Evans violated section
75-1.1.154
If the court answered the questions concerning section 75-1.1's reach and
constitutionality at all, its response was cryptic. The court addressed only one
sentence to the section 75-1.1 issues. After finding insufficient evidence to sup-
port the fraud verdict, the court stated, "Accordingly, because of the absence of
fraud, plaintiff's claim of an unfair trade practice under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is
without basis."' 5 5 The court cited no authority for the statement.
Myers & Chapman's terse language prevents any certain determination of
whether the court intended to curtail the applicability of section 75-1.1. The
brief disposition of the claim may indicate merely that the court did not consider
the pervasive questions surrounding section 75-1.1's reach and constitutional-
tems, Inc- Recovery of Lost Profits for a Violation of North Carolina General Statutes Section 75-L 1,
65 N.C.L. REv. 1169 (1987).
150. Olivetti, 319 N.C. at 549, 356 S.E.2d at 587.
151. Earlier in the 1988 term, the court expressly declined to limit section 75-1.1 to consumer
claims alone. United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389
(1988). The court stated, "After all, unfair trade practices involving only businesses affect the con-
sumer as well." Id. The court held that the statute could be invoked against a corporation that
induced a former employee of plaintiff corporation to breach a covenant not to compete. Id. at 666,
370 S.E.2d at 389. Tortious interference with contractual relations, like fraud, is an intentional tort.
Id. at 661, 370 S.E.2d at 387. Therefore, the United Laboratories holding did nothing more than
confirm the court of appeals' reasoning in Olivetti that section 75-1.1 encompasses intentional wrong-
doing and bad faith in interbusiness dealings. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. The
United Laboratories court did not elaborate on whether a corporate plaintiff could invoke section 75-
1. 1 against a defendant who had acted in good faith, nor did it examine the constitutionality of the
statute. See United Laboratories, 322 N.C. at 665, 370 S.E.2d at 389.
152. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 392.
153. See supra note 136.
154. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 563, 374 S.E.2d at 388-89. Thejury found that the conduct
of Thomas Evans was in or affecting commerce and that it misled or deceived the plaintiff. Id.
Based on the jury findings, the trial judge found a violation of section 75-1.1 and trebled damages.
Id. at 564, 374 S.E.2d at 389. This is the exact procedure previously approved by the court. See
supra note 126. The jury's findings that Evans' own conduct was deceptive presents an adequate
basis for holding him jointly and severally liable with the corporation, without any need to remand
for trial on gross negligence. Plaintiff raised this argument in its brief. Plaintiff-Appellant's New
Brief at 18-19.
155. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 573, 374 S.E.2d at 394.
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ity. 156 The court's choice of words--"because of the absence of fraud"-sug-
gests, however, that the court of appeals was correct in Olivetti when it
concluded that intentional fraud constitutes a sufficient basis for finding a viola-
tion of 75-1.1 even when the plaintiff is not a consumer.1 57 It is more problem-
atic to glean from the court's few words the constitutional limits of the statute in
purely commercial disputes with no bad faith or intentional wrongdoing. The
court may be stating merely that the trial judge was in error as a matter of law in
concluding that the false certifications at issue in Myers & Chapman were unfair
or deceptive. Such a conclusion would stand in sharp contrast, however, to
some of the unintentional misdeeds that North Carolina courts have held to
constitute section 75-1.1 violations in the consumer context.158 A more plausi-
ble deduction is that the supreme court agrees with critics of its Marshall deci-
sion who contend that the vagueness of the statute and decisions interpreting it
unconstitutionally prevent defendants in interbusiness disputes from regulating
their conduct in compliance with the law.159
One reading of the Myers & Chapman opinion would apply different stan-
dards to the determination of section 75-1.1 violations in consumer and com-
mercial contexts. Under this reading, a consumer plaintiff would need only to
show that defendant's conduct had a tendency to deceive. 160 A plaintiff com-
plaining of misdeeds in an interbusiness context would carry the additional bur-
den of showing intentional deception or bad faith.' 6 1 This distinction is wise as
a matter of policy. Commercial transactions easily can go sour. The prior state
of the law left parties to such deals in an uncertain predicament in which arbi-
trary enforcement of the statute by trial judges could lead to wide disparities in
damage awards.16 2
Litigants and judges should not be compelled to search for a change in the
law governing section 75-1.1 between the lines of a supreme court opinion. Un-
til the court chooses clearly to announce a consumer-commercial distinction, if
156. Defendants did not brief these issues. Instead, Thomas Evans contended that he was not
liable for fraud or gross negligence, and, therefore, he could not be individually liable for any judg-
ment against Evans, Inc. Defendant-Appellees' New Brief at 21.
157. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; see also supra note 151 (disdussing case allowing
corporate plaintiff to invoke section 75-1.1 against corporation that induced third party to breach a
contract).
158. See Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 468, 470, 343 S.E.2d 174,
178-79, 180 (1986) (insurance agent's misstatement of policy terms); Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C.
539, 540, 544, 276 S.E.2d 397, 398, 400-01 (1981) (mobile home park owner's misstatments of facili-
ties and services); Myers v. Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 89 N.C. App. 335, 336-37, 365 S.E.2d
663, 664 (1988) (automobile dealer's misrepresentation of model year and condition of vehicle); Lee
v. Payton, 67 N.C. App. 480,481-82, 313 S.E.2d 247, 248 (1984) (automobile dealer's misrepresenta-
tion that vehicle was a "demonstrator"); cf. Goodrich v. Rice, 75 N.C. App. 530, 535-36, 331 S.E.2d
195, 198-99 (1985) (no violation for breach of contract payment terms); Hammers v. Lowe's Cos., 48
N.C. App. 150, 154, 268 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1980) (no violation for failure to agree on contract terms).
For an exhaustive list of the types of activities to which section 75-1.1 has been applied, see Note,
supra note 149, at 1178-79.
159. See supra note 130.
160. See Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403 (1981).
161. See Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., 81 N.C. App. 1, 23, 344 S.E.2d 82, 95 (1986),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987).
162. See Farr, supra note 130, at 436.
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indeed it intends to create one, many attorneys and judges likely will miss the
message.1 63 In the meantime, litigation of section 75-1.1 claims will continue to
proceed in a cloud of uncertainty.
The net result of Myers & Chapman provides additional protection to busi-
nesses embroiled in commercial disputes. When the plaintiff is not a consumer,
the defendant may not be liable for treble damages under section 75-1.1 unless
the plaintiff can prove bad faith or intentional fraud. 64 Proof of fraud will be
more difficult, because the court has abandoned the culpable ignorance doc-
trine. 165 For the corporate directors and officers whose own conduct prompted
the dispute, the court has provided greater protection from individual liability
for negligent misrepresentations and possibly for other torts. 166
By failing to proclaim these changes directly, the North Carolina Supreme
Court leaves to guesswork the legal and policy bases for its rulings. The court
has shirked its highest duty to develop the law of the state in a clear and rational
manner. Litigants, practicing attorneys, and judges should not be forced to read
between the lines.
DINITA L. JAMES
163. Justice Meyer, as the author of both the Marshall and Myers & Chapman opinions, should
have realized that the court never had limited Marshall's liberal reading of section 75-1.1 to con-
sumer plaintiffs. If Myers & Chapman was an attempt to so limit Marshall, Justice Meyer should
have cited Marshall and explicitly distinguished it.
164. See supra notes 125-62 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 29-71 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 72-124 and accompanying text.
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